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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
wherein the proof was wanting presents nothing for review
by this court."' 5
It is a logical requirement, for the Supreme Court's review of
the trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial because the verdict
is contrary to the law and the evidence, that the appellant shall
specify the element or elements of the crime which are not sup-
ported by proof.
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the land-
mark decision of Mapp v. Ohio,' held that "all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. ' 2 Amplifying
its holding, the Court in the Mapp case went on to state: "Since
the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Govern-
ment.1 3 The Mapp decision is, of course, of extreme importance,
particularly in jurisdictions such as Louisiana,4 which in pre-
Mapp days had rejected the so-called "exclusionary rule."
In four cases decided during the past term, 5 the first deci-
sions in what no doubt will be a very long line of cases, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was called upon to consider the ad-
missibility of evidence obtained as the result of allegedly illegal
searches and seizures. Although fully recognizing the impor-
tance and binding effect of Mapp v. Ohio, the Louisiana Supreme
65. Id. at 183, 142 So. 2d at 390.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Id. at 655.
3. Ibid.
4. For a citation of Louisiana's prior jurisprudence in this connection, see
State v. Calascione, 243 La. 993, 997, 149 So. 2d 417, 418-19 (1963).
5. State v. Aias, 243 La. 946, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963); State v. Calascione,
243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417 (1963) ; State v. Cade, 244 La. 534, 153 So. 2d 382
(1963) ; and State v. Pennington, 244 La. 650, 153 So. 2d 876 (1963).
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Court in each of the four cases affirmed the action of the trial
court admitting the evidence, finding that the admissibility of
the evidence would not violate the rule of Mapp.
In State v. Aias,6 perhaps the most interesting of the four
from this standpoint, the court held that the search and seizure
there involved had not been illegal, that it was justifiable as
incidental to a lawful arrest.7 There is considerable question
in the writer's mind, however, whether there were in Aias suf-
ficient grounds, apart from the fruits of the search, to justify
the arrest.8
In State v. Pennington,9 the Louisiana Supreme Court in-
dicated that prerequisite to a decision that a defendant had
consented to what otherwise would have been an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure, and had thereby waived his constitu-
tional rights, is the finding that "the State has shown, by clear
and convincing evidence, that appellant's consent to the search
was freely and intelligently given." 10 And the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in the Pennington case goes on to state that the
principles governing federal courts in their determination as
to whether there has been a waiver of constitutional rights in
this regard are also applicable here. The court found in the
Pennington case that the outlined test was met, and the evidence
was therefore held admissible.
An interesting aspect of State v. Cade" was the court's state-
ment that since the record did not establish that the seized
object was the property of the defendant, "we cannot perceive
how the action of the Chief of Police constitutes a search and
seizure as to the defendant.' 1 2 Apparently, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court is thus taking the position that a defendant has
no standing to complain of the admissibility of an object seized
during the course of an illegal search unless he establishes that
he is the owner of the incriminating object. That such a rigorous
standing requirement is unduly demanding seems to this writer
6. 243 La. 946, 149 So. 2d 400 (1963).
7. Similar justification for the search and seizure was found in State v.
Calascione, 243 La. 993, 149 So. 2d 417 (1963), and State v. Cade, 244 La. 534,
153 So. 2d 382 (1963) (as an alternative holding).
8. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), quoted at some length
in the Ajas decision, and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
9. 244 La. 650, 153 So. 2d 876 (1963).
10. Id. at 658, 153 So. 2d at 878.
11. 244 La. 534, 153 So. 2d 382 (1963).
12. Id. at 549, 153 So. 2d at 388.
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to be amply demonstrated by the very persuasive opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States.8
A very interesting analogous problem to that dealt with in
Mapp v. Ohio14 concerns the admissibility of statements made
by a defendant while being held as the result of an illegal arrest
or during other illegal police detention. Although the United
States Supreme Court has clearly held15 that state courts are
not required to follow the McNabb-Mallory rule,16 it will not
surprise this writer if the Mapp rule is extended to this area,
especially to cases involving confessions made by a defendant
during a period of illegal detention subsequent to an unlawful
arrest. 7 In this connection it is very interesting to consider the
facts and holding of State v. Progue,is a murder case involving
three defendants. According to the facts set forth in the opinion
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, defendants were arrested
"shortly after the middle of March" and booked for "suspicion
of the murder of Jang Gow." So far as the writer has been
able to ascertain, there is no statutory authority in Louisiana
for the arrest of a person for "suspicion of murder." It is at
least arguable, therefore, that the arrest was illegal. If there
had been reasonable cause to justify an arrest for murder, would
not defendants have been booked for "murder" rather than "sus-
picion of murder"?
Between March 30 and April 4, defendants gave separate
13. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. See Culombe v. United States, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
16. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479, 77 S.Ct. 1356
(1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb-Mallory
rule holds inadmissible in federal court statements made by a defendant during
a period of illegal detention caused by an undue delay in bringing an arrested
person before a committing magistrate. For discussion, see: Mueller, The Law
Relating to Police Interrogation Privilege& and Limitation, in POLICE POWER AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 131 (Sowle ed. 1962) (previously published in 52 J. CRIM. L.
2 (1961)) ; Inbau, Police Interrogation -A Practical Necessity, in POLICE POWER
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 147 (Sowle ed. 1962) (previously published in 52
J. CRIM. L ..... (1961)); Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons:
A Skeptical View, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153 (Sowle ed.
1962) (previously published in 52 J. CRIM. L. 21 (1961)) ; Comment: The
McNabb Rule: Upshaw through Mallory, 43 VA. L. REV. 915 (1957).
17. The following may be considered together in this regard: Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) ; United States v. Lee, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.
1963). See also the dissenting opinion in Prescoe v. Maryland, 191 A.2d 226,
232-237 (Md. 1963), and Mr. Arnold S. Trebach's discussion in 1 DEFENDER
NEws LETTER, Issue No. 2, pages 6-7 (published by National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, American Bar Center).
18. 243 La. 337, 144 So. 2d 352 (1962).
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written confessions. On April 4, each defendant appeared be-
fore a deputy coroner and after listening to the reading of his
confession admitted that he had signed it. Each was questioned
further concerning his part in the crime, and this interrogation
was recorded on a recording machine and transcribed. There-
after, each defendant apparently signed the transcribed confes-
sion. In the meantime, each of the defendants had gone to the
scene of the offense, reenacted the crime, and given an oral con-
fession. At the trial, defense counsel objected to the admissibility
of the confessions. Their contention that the confessions had
not been freely and voluntarily given was rejected by both the
trial court and the Supreme Court. Defense counsel appears to
have relied in part upon the McNabb line of federal cases hold-
ing that statements made by a person under arrest during a
period of undue delay in bringing him before a committing
magistrate are inadmissible in federal court. The Louisiana
Supreme Court pointed out that the McNabb line of cases is
applicable only to federal courts, and that Louisiana courts have
rejected the McNabb rule.
It is important to note, however, that Louisiana has statutory
provisions 19 very similar to those in federal law, requiring gen-
erally that, after booking, a person arrested be brought before
a committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay." There is
no suggestion in the opinion of the court that these affirmative
statutory provisions of our law were in fact complied with in
this case, and the writer surmises that they were not.
It seems at least arguable that in the Progue case the ques-
tioned confessions were given during a period of illegal detention
following an illegal arrest, and that they were secured as a result
of such detention. As noted above, it will not surprise this writer
if the Mapp rule is extended to require the exclusion by state
courts of confessions so secured.20 If the laws of our state rela-
tive to arrest, search and seizure, etc., are unwise, then the laws
should be amended. In the meantime, the failure of law enforce-
19. LA. R.S. 15:79-80 (1950): "When a peace officer shall have made an
arrest with a warrant, he shall, after the prisoner shall have been booked, bring
him, without unnecessary delay, before the judge designated in the warrant.
"When any person shall have been arrested without a warrant, the peace
officer, after he shall have caused him to be booked, shall bring him, without
unnecessary delay, if the charge be such as to entitle the accused to a pre-
liminary examination, before the judge having authority to sit as a committing
magistrate in the case, otherwise, before the judge having trial jurisdiction
thereof."
20. See the authorities cited in note 17 supra.
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ment officers to abide by extant provisions of our state law in
this area may well result in the reversal of convictions.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS - PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The physician-patient privilege did not exist at common law2 '
and is still not recognized in England.2 2 Although the desirability
of such a privilege is a matter of heated controversy,2 3 two-
thirds of American jurisdictions have provided for it in some
form.2 4
The Louisiana Constitution of 192125 stipulated that the leg-
islature should provide for protection for communications made
to physicians, dentists, and druggists by patients and clients for
the purpose of obtaining treatment.26 In 1927, the Supreme
Court held in State v. Genna 7 that this constitutional provision
is not self-operative. The following year, when the Code of
Criminal Procedure was adopted,28 the legislature did in fact
make affirmative provision for a physician-patient privilege.
29
Was this legislative recognition somehow to suffice for the crea-
tion of a physician-patient privilege in civil cases ?3o
Whether Louisiana has a physician-patient privilege for civil
cases is a matter which has long been in doubt: the question has
previously been explored by an able comment in this review,31
and now is the subject of a square holding in a decision by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal.8 2 Boulware v. Boulware was
a custody case. Under the terms of a prior judgment of separa-
tion, custody of two minor children had been awarded to the
mother. In the instant proceeding, the father sought transfer
of custody to him, contending that because of a serious mental
21. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton revision 1961) ; JONES, EvI-
DENCE § 838 (5th ed. 1958) ; McCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 101 (1954).
22. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton revision 1961).
23. See ibid., and the authorities therein" cited.
24. Ibid.
25. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 12 (1921).
26. For earlier constitutional provisions, see La. CONST. art. 178 (1879) ; La.
CONST. art. 297 (1898) ; La. CONST. art. 297 (1913).
27. 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927).
28. La. ACTS 1928, No. 2.
29. For a discussion of the physician-patient privilege in Louisiana, see Com-
ment, 31 TUL. L. REV. 192 (1956).
30. For an excellent discussion of the applicability of the rules of evidence
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure to civil cases, see Comment, Were
the Louisiana Rules of Civil Evidence Affected by the Adoption of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure?, 14 LA. L. REV. 568 (1954).
31. The Doctor-Patient Privilege in Civil Cases in Louisiana, 20 LA. L. REV.
418 (1960).
32. Boulware v. Boulware, 153 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
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condition of the mother, allegedly diagnosed as chronic schizo-
phrenia, paranoid type, she was unfit to have the custody of the
children. To establish his claim, the husband called as a witness
the Chief of the Psychiatric Service of the hospital in which
the mother had allegedly been confined. The trial court sus-
tained the defendant's claim of privilege based upon the phy-
sician-patient relationship. The court of appeal reversed and
remanded the case, holding that there is no physician-patient
privilege in Louisiana civil cases. In reaching this conclusion,
the court noted that physician-patient privilege was unknown
to the common law and stated that there is no codal or statutory
authority for the privilege in Louisiana civil cases. 33 It relied
upon the State v. Genna determination that the constitutional
provision is not self-operative, and the fact that the legislature
thereafter had made no affirmative provision for a physician-
patient privilege other than in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The court also relied upon a decision arising in Louisiana and
decided by the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth
Circuit 34 which had reached a similar conclusion. The court in
the instant case did not discuss the Louisiana Supreme Court
decision in Savin v. Savin,35 which at least arguably contains
the suggestion that the Supreme Court is of the opinion that
Louisiana does have a physician-patient privilege for civil
cases.36
Of course, the very nature of a privilege is that it suppresses
relevant evidence, suppresses evidence that may cut the Gordian
knot. The instant case is a good example. Was the mother an
appropriate person to have custody? As indicated by the court,
the best witness as to the mental state of the mother was the
psychiatrist who had examined and treated her. From the stand-
point of ascertaining facts, and reaching the right conclusion on
the very delicate question of custody, society wants her psychia-
trist's testimony. On the other hand, what of future professional
33. It is interesting that the same argument could be used to support a
contention that the priest-penitent privilege does not exist in civil cases in Lou-
isiana. Although such a privilege is recognized for Louisiana criminal cases
(LA. R.S. 15:477 (1950)), there appears to be no other constitutional or statu-
tory authority for it. Wigmore takes the position that "the privilege cannot be
said to have been recognized as a rule of the common law, either in England or
in the United States." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 (McNaughton revision
1961).
34. Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 172 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1949).
35. 218 La. 754, 51 So. 2d 41 (1951).
36. See the discussion in Comment, The Doctor-Patient Privilege in Civil
Cases in Louisiana, 20 LA. L. REV. 418, 423 (1960).
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communications, and the possible impact on the public of -an
awareness that what is told to a a psychiatrist will be subject
to compelled disclosure in a subsequent civil case? Will a mother
who has been awarded custody seek the psychiatric help she
senses she needs if she is aware that the testimony of the psy-
chiatrist may result in loss of her children?
The problem is extremely difficult. Will society's best inter-
est be served by recognition or non-recognition of a physician-
patient privilege in civil cases? There are areas in which many
might agree that no physician-patient privilege should exist. If
plaintiff puts his physical condition at issue seeking money on
a personal injury claim, he should not be heard to suppress the
testimony of a physician as to that very condition. Similarly,
where a person has consulted a physician and then takes out a
life insurance policy, neither he nor the beneficiary under the
policy should be permitted to prevent disclosure as to the results
of that consultation. But there are circumstances where many
would argue that society's interest would best be served by a
rule of privilege. For example, shouldn't a party to a divorce
or separation proceeding based on adultery be able successfully
to claim privilege as to testimony by a physician consulted for
the cure of a "social disease," or the testimony of a psychiatrist
as to the revelation of extra-marital relations? Doesn't society
have a greater interest in encouraging the cure of the physical
or mental illness of the marital partner than in affording a
means to prove the grounds for dissolution of the marriage?
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has not yet spoken defini-
tively as to the existence vel non of a physician-patient privilege
in civil cases. What the decision will be is still a matter of doubt.
As has been seen, complex policy considerations, not easy of
resolution, are involved.
HEARSAY
In State v. DePietro,87 a murder case, an important factual
issue concerned whether the homicide had occurred on Ann
Street. Defendant's account had been that decedent had been
shot on Ann Street by a stranger. In order to disprove defend-
ant's version in this connection, the district attorney asked the
sheriff if he had found anyone who heard shots on Ann Street
during the afternoon of the killing. The trial court overruled
37. 243 La. 897, 148 So. 2d 593 (1963).
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defense counsel's objection that the question called for hearsay
testimony, and the witness answered in the negative. On appeal,
the Supreme Court said:
"Clearly the testimony sought to be elicited cannot be
considered hearsay. Its only purpose was to show the nega-
tive result of an investigation made by the sheriff on Ann
Street at the place where defendant had asserted the shoot-
ing occurred." 88
The holding seems to this writer to be open to question. The
relevancy of the line of inquiry clearly was to show that no one
had heard shots on Ann Street during the afternoon in ques-
tion, and hence that no shots had been fired. Wasn't the ques-
tion impliedly asking whether the sheriff had found anyone who
had said that he had heard shots on Ann Street, etc., in order
to show that everyone whom he had interrogated had said he
heard no shots? Is there any substantial difference between the
question asked and one asking the sheriff whether everyone on
Ann Street with whom he had spoken had stated that he had
heard no shots?
It seems to this writer that in effect the sheriff was being
asked to relate the results of questions he had addressed to
persons on Ann Street, in order for the trier of fact to accept
the truth of the out-of-court utterances- that they had heard
no shots -in order to show that no shots had been fired.
It is true that the question was asked in order to show the
results of the investigation by the sheriff, but it seems clear
that a district attorney would not have been permitted to show
that persons interrogated had said the opposite - that they had
heard shots - in order to show that shots had been fired. There
appears to be no greater reliability in out-of-court assertions
that the declarants had heard no shots than that declarants had
heard shots. In either event, one is dealing with out-of-court
assertions 9 offered in court for their assertive value, and the
hearsay rule is designed to have such assertions come to the
jury firsthand so that the declarant can be placed under oath
and subjected to cross-examination.
38. Id. at 902, 148 So. 2d at 594.
39. Assertive out-of-court statements are, of course, to be differentiated from
out-of-court conduct from which inferences are to be drawn. Thus, absence of
complaints can be distinguished from admissible assertions of a positive nature.
See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 229 (1954) and authorities there cited. For gen-
eral discussion of the nature of hearsay, see Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay
as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. REv. 611 (1954).
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HEARSAY - ADMISSIONS
Is a hearsay objection necessarily overcome by a showing
that a proffered out-of-court statement was made in the pres-
ence of a party litigant? In a prior discussion in this Review,
the writer has taken the position that it should not.40 However,
as was properly recognized in a court of appeal decision during
the past term, silence of a party in the presence of accusatory
statements may at times qualify as an admission. 41
Are statements made by law enforcement officers in the
presence of an accused in legal custody admissible over objec-
tion? In State v. Hayden,42 the Supreme Court held in the nega-
tive. The problem is extremely interesting, involving delicate
policy considerations and is explored in a student note in this
Review.43
40. 23 LA. L. REv. 412 (1963).
41. Rooker v. Checker Cab Co. of New Orleans, Inc., 145 So. 2d 631 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
42. 243 La. 793, 147 So. 2d 392 (1962).
43. Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 115 (1963).
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